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I. INTRODUCTION
There is little disagreement among people as to whether sex traf-
ficking1 is a good or a bad practice.  Few legal and political issues en-
joy more of a consensus of opinion than the abolition of sex trafficking,
and it has been generally recognized among people from all cultures
and backgrounds as an inherent violation of basic human rights and
dignity.  But even an issue with as much universal unanimity as the
abolition of sex trafficking cannot escape its own form of controversy.
There is great debate among policy makers as to the role of law re-
garding prostitution in the global fight against sex trafficking, and
particularly whether criminalizing or decriminalizing prostitution is
the best state approach to combatting sex trafficking.
While few argue that criminalizing or decriminalizing prostitution
is the sole step required to effectively counter sex trafficking, many
argue that either approach would certainly play an important role in a
state’s ability to investigate and prosecute perpetrators as well as pro-
tect victims.  On one end of the spectrum, advocates for decriminaliza-
tion argue that this would offer greater protections to victims through
tighter regulation of sex work.2  Decriminalization would also expand
the rights of consenting men and women who engage in prostitution
as a form of legitimate work, allowing them to enjoy the right to con-
trol their own bodies as well as occupational benefits such as health
care, retirement plans, and unionization.3  These expanded rights
would ensure that sex workers are not subject to exploitative work
environments and would also allow them to exercise their right to
work.
On the other end of the spectrum, advocates for criminalization ar-
gue “prostitution can never be a choice and the ‘profession’ is inher-
ently based on a system of male sexual dominance, appropriating the
female body for pleasure and reinforcing the subordination and sexual
objectification of women.”4  Advocates for criminalization further ar-
gue decriminalizing prostitution would make it easier for sex traffick-
ers to exploit women by giving them a legitimate front to an
1. Sex trafficking is often generally referred to as “human trafficking” or as “traf-
ficking in persons,” although neither are an entirely accurate articulation.  Sex
trafficking is just one manifestation of human trafficking and trafficking-in-per-
sons, as humans are trafficked for a variety of exploitative purposes, not just sex-
ual.  So for the purposes of this Article, the term sex trafficking will refer to
trafficking for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation and any references
to “human trafficking” or “trafficking in persons” shall encompass sex trafficking
as well as all other forms of trafficking.  The definition of trafficking in persons
will be discussed below. See infra section II.B.
2. SIDDARTH KARA, SEX TRAFFICKING: INSIDE THE BUSINESS OF MODERN SLAVERY 100
(2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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illegitimate business, which would also make it more difficult for the
state to investigate violations.5  They further argue that no amount of
regulation can protect women from being exploited by their pimps and
that as a practical matter, decriminalizing prostitution creates a
greater demand for sex for which there is not enough legitimate sup-
ply to meet.6  This greater demand gives pimps an incentive to traffic
women in order to meet this demand.7  For these reasons, pro-
criminalization advocates hold that decriminalizing prostitution will
always lead to a rise in sex trafficking regardless of how many precau-
tionary steps and regulations a state may create.
This Comment does not intend to establish that decriminalization
is inextricably linked, empirically, to a rise in the prevalence of sex
trafficking as this is an issue best left to social scientists and quantita-
tive researchers.  For the purposes of this Comment, however, it will
be assumed that this is the case and that the decriminalization of
prostitution creates an increased demand for sex, leading to a greater
prevalence of sex trafficking through forced prostitution.  This as-
sumption is not merely grounded in theory, but is supported by signifi-
cant scholarly research.8  Based on this underlying assumption, this
Comment will attempt to answer two key questions: first, is sex traf-
ficking a form of or inextricably linked to slavery, as understood in the
international community?  Second, if so, does this connection create
an obligation to criminalize prostitution in order to take legally ade-
quate steps to address sex trafficking?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to examine rele-
vant norms of international law as they relate to sex trafficking and
slavery, investigate the interrelationship between norms specifically
related to human trafficking and potentially conflicting human rights
norms, investigate the scope of the obligation to criminalize sex traf-
ficking, and discuss whether achieving the goals underlying this obli-
gation require criminalizing prostitution.  In particular, it is
important to establish whether sex trafficking is a form of slavery
under international law, and therefore whether its prohibition is a
peremptory jus cogens norm.  This Comment argues that it is.  This
Comment will then analyze whether domestic laws that decriminalize
or legalize prostitution are in conflict with this jus cogens norm.
5. Donna M. Hughes, The “Natasha” Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of
Trafficking in Women, 53 J. INT’L AFF. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 625, 647–48 (2000).
6. Janice G. Raymond, Ten Reasons for Not Legalizing Prostitution and a Legal Re-
sponse to the Demand for Prostitution, 2 J. TRAUMA PRAC. 315, 324 (2003).
7. Id.
8. Seo-Young Cho et al., Does Legalized Prostitution Increase Human Trafficking?,
41 WORLD DEV. 67, 68 (2012) (finding that on average, countries where prostitu-
tion is legal experience larger reported human trafficking inflows).
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II. BACKGROUND OF APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
SLAVERY AND SEX TRAFFICKING
Sex trafficking, as well as other forms of human trafficking, have
generally been referred to as “modern-day slavery” or as a “contempo-
rary form of slavery” in academic and public discourse.9  Many promi-
nent anti-trafficking scholars hold to the position that sex trafficking
inherently involves slavery.10  This seems to be a logical connection,
as the link between sex trafficking and chattel slavery11 is immedi-
ately apparent.  Dr. Anne Gallagher articulates this connection well:
Both practices involve the organized movement of individuals, generally
across national borders, for exploitative purposes. Both are primarily con-
ducted outside the public realm by private entities for private profit. Both
seek to secure control over individuals by minimizing or even eliminating per-
sonal autonomy. Neither system can be sustained without massive and sys-
tematic violations of human rights. References to slavery in the new
international legal framework around trafficking, and vice versa to trafficking
in contemporary rules on slavery, have reinforced this connection.12
While this connection is well recognized by prominent scholars and
in nearly every anti-trafficking community, there is a great amount of
uncertainty as to whether a legitimate legal connection exists.  In or-
der to address the over-arching question as to whether an interna-
tional legal obligation exists to criminalize prostitution, it is first
necessary to examine the legal connection (or perhaps the lack
thereof) between sex trafficking and slavery in international law.
From this examination, this Comment will attempt to determine
whether the definition of slavery has expanded to include sex traffick-
ing.  A finding in the affirmative is necessary to link together legalized
prostitution and slavery.13  The first step in this process is to under-
stand international law as it relates to each practice.
9. See generally KARA, supra note 2; KEVIN BALES, DISPOSABLE PEOPLE: NEW SLAV-
ERY IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (3rd ed. 2012); KATHLEEN BARRY, FEMALE SEXUAL
SLAVERY (1979) (equating sex trafficking and slavery as the same practice).
10. See generally KARA, supra note 2; BALES, supra note 9; BARRY, supra note 9
(equating sex trafficking and slavery as the same practice).
11. Chattel slavery is what many people would generally think of in relation to the
term “slavery,” particularly an institution whereby human beings are considered
to be the personal property of another human being.  This is generally accompa-
nied by a legal recognition of the owner’s property interest in “his” slaves.  The
slavery institution which existed in the United States prior to the Civil War
would be an example of chattel slavery.
12. ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 177
(2010).
13. That is, legalized prostitution with the underlying assumption that it is inextri-
cably linked to rises in the prevalence of sex trafficking.
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A. International Law Prohibiting Slavery and the Slave
Trade
Slavery and the slave trade are two of the few practices whose pro-
hibition is recognized as a jus cogens norm of customary international
law, and as creating obligations erga omnes. These practices are also
completely prohibited by the international community in times of
peace and in times of war.14  The Congress of Vienna in 1814 was the
first international instrument to recognize the slave trade as an inher-
ent violation of human dignity.15  While this declaration did not
criminalize the slave trade at an international level, it strongly con-
demned the trade as “repugnant to the principles of humanity and
universal morality.”16  As traditional chattel slavery and the slave
trade were abolished around the world throughout the rest of the
nineteenth century, many began to question whether slavery and the
slave trade should be declared a crime against humanity and
criminalized at an international level.17  These discussions led to sev-
eral treaties alluding to an ill-defined international prohibition
against slavery and the slave trade, but it was not until the Slavery
Convention of 1926 that slavery and the slave trade were unambigu-
ously addressed at the international level.18
Under the Slavery Convention, slavery was defined as “the status
or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching
to the rights of ownership are exercised.”19  Attempts were made to
include lesser servitudes in this initial definition, but, for reasons be-
yond the scope of this Comment, were objected to by the Republic of
South Africa.20  The slave trade was defined as including:
all acts involved in the capture, acquisition or disposal of a person with intent
to reduce him to slavery; all acts involved in the acquisition of a slave with a
view to selling or exchanging him; all acts of disposal by sale or exchange of a
slave acquired with a view to being sold or exchanged, and, in general, every
act of trade or transport in slaves.21
This definition of slavery does not require there to be literal owner-
ship, like in chattel slavery.  Rather, the parties to the 1926 Conven-
14. See JEAN ALLAIN, SLAVERY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: OF HUMAN EXPLOITATION AND
TRAFFICKING 110 (2013).
15. JEAN ALLAIN, THE LEGAL UNDERSTANDING OF SLAVERY: FROM THE HISTORICAL TO
THE CONTEMPORARY 91 (2012).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 99.
18. Id.  These treaties included the General Act of the Berlin Congo Conference of
1884, the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890, and the Convention of
St. Germain-en-Laye of 1919, among others.
19. Slavery Convention art. 1(1), Sep. 25, 1926, 60 L.N.T.S. 254 [hereinafter Slavery
Convention].
20. ALLAIN, supra note 14, at 113.
21. Slavery Convention, supra note 19, art. 1(2).
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tion understood this to cover more than just chattel slaves.22  The
Republic of South Africa articulated this understanding during the
convention negotiations:
That definition puts as the test of slavery the status or condition of a person
over whom all or any of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership are
exercised. In other words, a person is a slave if any other person can, by law or
enforceable custom, claim such property in him as would be claimed if he were
an inanimate object; and thus the natural freedom of will possessed by a per-
son to offer or render his labour or to control the fruits thereof or the consider-
ation therefrom is taken from him.23
Under Article 2 of the Slavery Convention, the parties undertook
an obligation to take every step within their respective jurisdictions to
abolish slavery “in all its forms.”24  These obligations will be examined
in greater detail below, but for now it is important to note that the
inclusion of the language “in all forms” acknowledges that slavery
takes on many different forms.  This same language was used in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that slavery
and the slave trade shall be prohibited “in all their forms.”25
The 1926 definition is still the accepted definition of slavery in in-
ternational law, as it was reproduced in substance in both the 1956
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery and the 1998
Statute of the International Criminal Court.26  The content of the defi-
nition, however, has evolved throughout the twentieth century.  At
first, the 1926 definition seems to apply only to situations where there
was actual ownership, but subsequent treaties and commentaries
make clear that it is meant to be broader than such an understand-
ing.27  This is relevant because under Article 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion, subsequent agreements provide context which shall be taken into
22. JEAN ALLAIN, THE SLAVERY CONVENTION: THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE
1926 LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONVENTION AND THE 1956 UNITED NATIONS CONVEN-
TION 55 (2008).
23. Id. (quoting League of Nations reply from South Africa).  Pre-treaty statements
such as these can provide helpful insight into the interpretation of the 1926 defi-
nition.  Under Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, sup-
plementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the
treaty, are recognized as permissible means of interpreting provisions of interna-
tional treaties.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 23,1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
24. Slavery Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(a)–(b).
25. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948).
26. ALLAIN, supra note 14, at 111.
27. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and In-
stitutions and Practices Similar to Slavery art. 1(a)-(d), Sep. 7, 1956, 266
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1956 Supplementary Convention]; Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art. 7(2)(c); International
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2
(2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes].
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account when interpreting or applying a particular provision, in this
case the definition of slavery.28
The 1956 Supplementary Convention, while not modifying the defi-
nition of slavery itself, added state obligations to abolish debt bond-
age, serfdom, servile marriage, and child trafficking.29  The
Convention classified these practices not as slavery themselves, but as
practices similar to slavery.30  The 1998 Rome Statute slightly ex-
panded the scope of the 1926 definition of slavery by stating that it
also includes “the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking
persons, in particular women and children.”31  The Rome Statute clas-
sified enslavement and other slavery-like practices as “crimes against
humanity.”32  These slavery-like practices include rape, sexual slav-
ery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or
any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity.33
Finally, slavery is one of the practices considered to be an obliga-
tion erga omnes.34  These are obligations owed to the international
community as a whole and, if breached, allow any state to deem itself
injured and thus invoke state responsibility.35  The International
Court of Justice identified this obligation as early as 1966.36  The im-
plications of this obligation will be discussed in further detail below.
B. International Law Prohibiting Sex Trafficking
Sex trafficking and trafficking in persons have only recently been
seriously addressed in international law.  Several twentieth-century
conventions condemned the practice, but never specifically defined
it.37  These conventions typically only focused on the sex trafficking of
women and children and white slavery, doing very little to create a
28. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 31(3)(a) (“There shall be taken into ac-
count, together with the context: any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions . . .”).
29. 1956 Supplementary Convention, supra note 27.
30. Id.
31. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art.
7(2)(c).
32. Id. art. 7(1).
33. Id. art. 7(1)(g).
34. ALLAIN, supra note 15, at 101.
35. M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Crimes: Jus Cogens and Obligatio Egra
Omnes, 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 63, 72–73 (1996).
36. See Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3
(Feb. 5).
37. These treaties include the International Agreement for the Suppression of the
White Slave Traffic art. 1, May 18, 1904, 35 Stat. 1979, 1 L.N.T.S. 83; Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic of Women and Children,
Sept. 30, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 415; International Convention for the Suppression of
the Traffic in Women of Full Age, Oct. 11, 1933, 53 U.N.T.S. 49; and the Interna-
tional Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of the Ex-
ploitation of the Prostitution of Others, Mar. 21, 1950, 96 U.N.T.S. 271.
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uniform understanding of the issue of trafficking in persons.38  While
trafficking in persons was vaguely referred to in the preceding trea-
ties, the practice was not definitively defined until 2000 in the Proto-
col to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially
Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, or as it is more commonly
referred to, the Palermo Protocol.39  Article 3(a) of the Protocol defines
trafficking in persons as:
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of person, by
means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of
the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.40
The Palermo Protocol subsequently states that exploitation “shall in-
clude, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or
practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.”41
This classification identifies commercial sexual exploitation as a form
of trafficking in persons, as well as forced labor and organ harvesting.
Slavery and practices similar to slavery are included as separate
forms of exploitation apart from sex trafficking.
This definition of trafficking in persons in Article 3(a) of the Pa-
lermo Protocol includes three elements: action, means, and purpose,
with the action and means serving as the actus reus elements and the
purpose serving as the mens rea element.  In order for there to be traf-
ficking, there must be an action (recruitment, transportation, trans-
fer, harbouring, or receipt of person) secured through a specific means
(coercion, force, abduction, fraud, deception, etc.) for a specific purpose
(exploitation).42  Professor Silvia Scarpa describes these elements as
three phases: (a) the movement of the victims from one place to an-
other; (b) the achievement of their consent through improper means;
and (c) their final exploitation.43  The “means” element is waived (and
38. Rebecca L. Wharton, Note, A New Paradigm for Human Trafficking: Shifting the
Focus from Prostitution to Exploitation in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act,
16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 753, 761–62 (2010).
39. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Wo-
men and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime art. 3(a), Nov. 15, 2000, 2237 U.N.T.S. 319 [here-
inafter Palermo Protocol] (also commonly referred to as the Trafficking Protocol
or the UN Trafficking Protocol).
40. Id. art. 3(a).
41. Id.
42. GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 29.
43. SILVIA SCARPA, TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS: MODERN SLAVERY 60 (2008).  Al-
though this understanding may be helpful, it is arguably not entirely accurate.
The UN definition identifies actions that do not involve movement in and of
themselves, such as recruitment and harbouring, so trafficking may occur even if
there has not been any actual movement.  Furthermore, according to the UN defi-
582 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:574
therefore not required to be proved) in situations where the victim is a
child,44 and the consent of a victim (regardless of age) is irrelevant if it
can be shown that any of the “means” laid out in the definition were
employed to induce the nominal consent.45
There was much debate surrounding this definition during the
drafting stages of the Palermo Protocol, and the most divisive debate
revolved around the issue of prostitution.46  One great point of debate
was whether to draft the definition so as to include non-coerced adult
migrant prostitution, and the other was whether to include “use in
prostitution” (generally understood as “voluntary” prostitution) as an
end purpose of trafficking.47  Many states argued that drawing dis-
tinctions between forced and voluntary prostitution was morally unac-
ceptable and would lend unfounded legitimacy to prostitution.48  They
argued that all forms of prostitution are considered to be forced and
thus amount to collusion with human trafficking.49  Therefore, these
states wanted “use in prostitution” included as an end means to con-
firm international legal opposition to all prostitution.50  Other states
argued that including this language would blur the distinction be-
tween trafficking and migrant smuggling and make the definition of
trafficking overly broad.51  They argued it would divert attention and
resources away from the real problem and include as trafficking very
minor instances of fraud and deception on the part of someone recruit-
ing a person for prostitution.52  Ultimately the final version included a
narrowly-tailored reference to the “exploitation of the prostitution of
others,” recognizing non-coerced prostitution as an end means of traf-
ficking while avoiding an overarching international stance on prosti-
tution itself.53  According to one scholar, this compromise
demonstrated states’ willingness to set aside their individual views on
prostitution to achieve the greater goals of securing an agreed defini-
nition the “means” element does not indicate that any level of consent has been
achieved.  Someone can be trafficked through means that have never induced any
level of consent on the part of the victim.  What it actually indicates is that if
there is any consent, it is irrelevant if obtained through improper means such as
fraud, coercion, or deception.
44. Palermo Protocol, supra note 39, art. 3(c); id. art. 3(d) (defining a child as any
person under the age of 18).
45. Id. art. 3(b).
46. See GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 26–29.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 26–27.
49. SCARPA, supra note 43, at 59.
50. GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 26–27.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 27–29.
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tion and maintaining the integrity of the distinction between traffick-
ing and migrant smuggling.54
Since the adoption of the Palermo Protocol in 2000, there have
been no other world-wide international treaties on human trafficking.
The majority of state-parties, however, have enacted comprehensive
anti-trafficking laws that generally reflect the definition in the Pa-
lermo Protocol.55  As of 2014, 146 states have enacted domestic legis-
lation that criminalizes all aspects of trafficking in persons explicitly
listed in the Palermo Protocol.56  For example, the United States
passed the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (“TVPA”) in 2000, the
first piece of comprehensive legislation specifically targeting traffick-
ing in persons in the United States.57  The TVPA defined severe forms
of trafficking in persons as:
Sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or
coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained
18 years of age; or the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or
obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or
coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt
bondage, or slavery.”58  It subsequently defines sex trafficking as “the recruit-
ment, harboring, transportation, provision, obtaining, patronizing, or solicit-
ing of a person for the purpose of a commercial sex act.59
Several regional treaties have also been adopted.60  These treaties
did not significantly alter the definition of trafficking in persons, but
afforded greater protections for victims.  Perhaps the most significant
of these treaties is the 2005 European Convention on Action Against
Trafficking (“European Trafficking Convention”).61  This convention,
while mirroring the Palermo Protocol definition, expanded on the defi-
nition by offering several insights into its provisions.62  In the Explan-
atory Report, the drafters noted that the abuse of a position of
vulnerability encompasses “any state of hardship in which a human
54. Id. at 28–29.
55. Id. at 42.
56. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING
IN PERSONS 2014 at 51, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.10 (2014) [hereinafter UNODC
2014 Report].
57. Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-13 (2000) [hereinafter
TVPA].
58. Id. § 7102(8)(A)–(B).
59. Id. § 7102(9).
60. SAARC Convention on Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Women and
Children for Prostitution, Jan. 5, 2002 [hereinafter SAARC Convention], http://
www.saarc-sec.org/userfiles/conv-traffiking.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/2DDA-
5J5L]; European Union Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking
in Human Beings art. 1(1), 2002 O.J. (L 203) 1 [hereinafter EU Framework Deci-
sion]; Council of Europe Convention on Action Against Trafficking in Human Be-
ings art. 19, May 16, 2005, 197 E.T.S. 16 [hereinafter European Trafficking
Convention].
61. European Trafficking Convention, supra note 60.
62. Id.
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being is impelled to accept being exploited,” including “abusing the ec-
onomic insecurity or poverty of an adult hoping to better their own
and their family’s lot.”63  It went on to further note that the fact that
an individual is willing to engage in prostitution does not mean that
she or he has consented to exploitation.64  Article 19 of the European
Trafficking Convention states:
Each Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its internal law, the
use of services which are the object of exploitation as referred to in Article 4
paragraph a65 of this Convention, with the knowledge that the person is a
victim of trafficking in human beings.66
Finally, the preamble to the European Trafficking Convention states
“trafficking in human beings may result in slavery for victims.”67  The
implications of this statement will be discussed below.
C. Sex Trafficking as Slavery: Overlap of the Practices
Having examined individually the applicable international laws
relating to the practices of slavery and sex trafficking, this Comment
will now analyze whether the definition of slavery has expanded to
include sex trafficking as a legally recognized form of slavery.  It is
also important to take a moment to discuss the possible implications
of such a classification.
If trafficking in persons—which includes sex trafficking—is found
to fall under the classification of slavery, then trafficking in persons
would reach the status of a jus cogens norm of customary interna-
tional law.  Such a status carries with it considerable legal implica-
tions.  For example, every treaty and other international norm that
has not attained the status of jus cogens and is in conflict with the
abolition of sex trafficking would be void.  This rule would apply both
prospectively68 and retroactively.69  Furthermore, all treaty reserva-
tions that would be in conflict with this jus cogens norm would be
inadmissible, states would be obliged to avoid the recognition of an
entity that violates this norm, and states may avoid granting interna-
tional legitimacy to national legislative and administrative acts of
63. Explanatory Report on the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Traf-
ficking in Human Beings art. 4, ¶ 83, May 16, 2005, 197 E.T.S. 16 [hereinafter
Explanatory Report on European Trafficking Convention].
64. Id. ¶ 97.
65. Article 4(a) states the definition of trafficking in persons, which mirrors the Pa-
lermo Protocol definition. See Palermo Protocol, supra note 39, art. 3(a).
66. European Trafficking Convention, supra note 60.
67. Id. pmbl.
68. Vienna Convention, supra note 23, art. 53 (“A treaty is void if, at the time of its
conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.”).
69. Id. art. 64 (“If a new peremptory norm of general international law emerges, any
existing treaty which is in conflict with that norm becomes void and
terminates.”).
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other states authorizing behavior that is contrary to this jus cogens
norm.70  Thus, if trafficking in persons becomes a jus cogens norm and
an obligation to criminalize prostitution is found, then states may
avoid granting legitimacy to prostitution laws that legalize the
practice.
While it may seem that slavery and trafficking in persons have
been distinguished in international treaties, it is also apparent that
the inclusion of references to slavery in trafficking in persons instru-
ments demonstrates an internationally recognized link between the
two practices.   For example, the Palermo Protocol definition specifi-
cally includes slavery as an end means for trafficking in persons,71
and the European Trafficking Convention states “trafficking in
human beings may result in slavery for victims.”72  There is no refer-
ence, however, to trafficking in persons within slavery instruments.73
Trafficking in persons was not even identified as a practice similar to
slavery, and the fact that the international community chose to sepa-
rately address trafficking in persons lends considerable weight to the
argument that the two practices remain mutually exclusive.  It is
worth noting, however, that the most authoritative slavery conven-
tions were formed in 1926 and 1956, long before the first authoritative
convention on the definition of trafficking in persons.  Perhaps the in-
clusion of slavery as a form of trafficking in persons in the latter con-
ventions signifies a development in the international understanding of
the two issues.  Thus, a determination based solely on treaty law is
anything but conclusive.  While it appears from the face of interna-
tional treaties that the two practices were initially thought of as dif-
ferent, an examination of international jurisprudence and deeper
analysis of relevant provisions may lead to a different conclusion.
Under the 1926 definition, slavery can only legally exist when any
or all the powers attaching to the rights of ownership are exercised
over a person.74  A power attaching to the rights of ownership does not
necessarily mean that the “owner” has legal title to an individual, but
is instead simply an indication that the victim is under a degree of
control.75  In the words of Jean Allain, “A person is a slave if . . . the
natural freedom of will possessed by a person to offer or render his
labor or to control the fruits thereof or the consideration therefrom is
taken away from him.”76  In order to determine whether sex traffick-
70. SCARPA, supra note 43, at 80.
71. Palermo Protocol, supra note 39, art. 3(a).
72. European Trafficking Convention, supra note 60, pmbl.
73. Namely, the 1926 Slavery Convention, the 1956 Supplementary Convention, and
the 1998 Rome Statute.
74. Slavery Convention, supra note 19, art. 1(1).
75. ALLAIN, supra note 15, at 320.
76. Jean Allain, The Definition of Slavery in International Law, 52 HOW. L.J. 239,
247–48 (2009).
586 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 95:574
ing falls under this definition, it is necessary to analyze whether any
one of these powers are exercised when a person meets the three ele-
ments of trafficking in persons for the purpose of commercial sexual
exploitation.  The United Nations Secretary-General articulated the
earliest form of helpful guidance as to what constitutes a power at-
taching to the rights of ownership for the purposes of slavery in a 1953
memorandum.77  He identified six conditions that are each a manifes-
tation of power attaching to the rights of ownership:
1. The individual of servile status may be made the object of a purchase;
2. The master may use the individual of servile status, and in particular his
capacity to work, in an absolute manner, without any restriction other
than that which might be expressly provided by law;
3. The products of labor of the individual of servile status become the prop-
erty of the master without any compensation commensurate to the value
of the labor;
4. The ownership of the individual of servile status can be transferred to
another person;
5. The servile status is permanent, that is to say, it cannot be terminated by
the will of the individual subject to it;
6. The servile status is transmitted ipso facto to descendants of the individ-
ual having such status.78
In 2012, the Members of the Research Network on the Legal Parame-
ters of Slavery developed the Bellagio–Harvard Guidelines on the Le-
gal Parameters of Slavery.79  Within these guidelines, they identified
several other individual manifestations of powers attaching to the
rights of ownership.  These manifestations are buying, selling, or
transferring of a person, using a person, managing the use of a person,
profiting from the use of a person, transferring a person to an heir or
successor, and disposal, mistreatment or neglect of a person.80
There are several provisions of international treaties that begin to
establish links between trafficking in persons and the powers attach-
ing to the rights of ownership of a person.  Perhaps the clearest can be
found in an explanatory footnote in the ICC Elements of Crimes.81
Article 7(1)(c) of this instrument describes the elements of the crime
against humanity of enslavement.82  The first element of enslavement
is met when “the perpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attach-
ing to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by
purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or person, or
by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty.”83  In a footnote
77. ALLAIN, supra note 14, at 114.
78. Id.
79. RESEARCH NETWORK ON THE LEGAL PARAMETERS OF SLAVERY, BELLAGIO–HARVARD
GUIDELINES ON THE LEGAL PARAMETERS OF SLAVERY (2012) [hereinafter Bel-
lagio–Harvard Guidelines].
80. See id. (referencing guideline 4(a)–(f)).
81. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 27.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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supplementing this element, the drafters stated, “It is also understood
that the conduct described in this element includes trafficking in per-
sons, in particular women and children.”84  Furthermore, in the actual
text of the Rome Statute, enslavement is defined as, “the exercise of
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a
person and includes the exercise of such power in the course of traffick-
ing in persons, in particular women and children.”85  There can hardly
be a clearer link made between the practice of slavery and trafficking
in persons.
This understanding has been reflected in recent decisions by inter-
national courts.  There are two decisions which provide considerable
support for this understanding.  In 2010, the European Court of
Human Rights recognized in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia that “traf-
ficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, is
based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership.”86
As part of its reasoning, the court stated:
It [trafficking in human beings] treats human beings as commodities to be
bought and sold and put to forced labour, often for little or no payment, usu-
ally in the sex industry but also elsewhere. It implies close surveillance of the
activities of victims, whose movements are often circumscribed. It involves the
use of violence and threats against victims, who live and work under poor
conditions. It is described by Interights and in the explanatory report accom-
panying the Anti-Trafficking Convention as the modern form of the old world-
wide slave trade.87
While this case does explicitly state that trafficking in persons inher-
ently involves the exercise of powers attaching to the rights of owner-
ship, it declined to go so far as to say that trafficking in persons is
inherently a form of slavery. It merely held that trafficking in persons
inherently violates Article 4 of the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which states that “No one
shall be held in slavery or servitude” and that “No one shall be re-
quired to perform forced or compulsory labor.”88  The court in Rantsev
did not indicate whether trafficking in persons constitutes slavery,
servitude, or forced and compulsory labor.89
In a less clear but certainly applicable case, Prosecutor v. Kunarac,
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
explicitly recognized that the definition of slavery has evolved in inter-
national law from its original understanding in 1926.90  In a case that
84. Id. at 10 n.11 (emphasis added).
85. Rome Statute, supra note 31, art. 7(2)(c) (emphasis added).
86. Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 2010-I, Eur. Ct. H.R. 65.
87. Id. at 68–69.
88. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms art. 4, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5.
89. Rantsev, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 69.
90. Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
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involved a defendant charged with the crime against humanity of en-
slavement, the tribunal identified several factors to consider when ex-
amining whether slavery exists.  These factors include elements of
control and ownership, the restriction or control of an individual’s au-
tonomy, restriction or control of an individual’s freedom of choice, con-
trol of someone’s physical movement, control of physical environment,
psychological control, measures taken to prevent or deter escape,
threat of force or coercion, duration, assertion of exclusivity, subjec-
tion to cruel treatment and abuse, control of sexuality and forced la-
bor, and the accruing of some gain to the perpetrator.91  The tribunal
went on to hold that “further indications of enslavement include ex-
ploitation; the exaction of forced or compulsory labor or service, often
without remuneration and often, though not necessarily, involving
physical hardship; sex; prostitution; and human trafficking.”92  Thus,
the tribunal recognized that trafficking in persons serves as an indica-
tion of slavery, although it did not go so far as to explicitly state that
trafficking in persons is slavery.
Furthermore, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has
linked trafficking in persons with violations of Article 8 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on several occa-
sions.93  Article 8 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o one shall be held in
slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms shall be prohib-
ited. . . . No one shall be held in servitude. . . . No one shall be required
to perform forced or compulsory labor.”94  The Committee usually in-
terpreted this provision in the context of evaluating whether states
parties to the ICCPR have taken adequate steps to criminalize traf-
ficking and protect trafficked persons.  While the Committee has not
gone so far as to explicitly state that trafficking is slavery under inter-
national law, it has recognized the shifting understanding of the two
practices and that some judiciaries are beginning to treat sex traffick-
ing offences as acts which can be assimilated to slavery.95
Despite the absence of an explicit statement by any court or tribu-
nal referring to trafficking in persons as slavery, the trajectory in in-
ternational understanding of the issues seems to be moving in that
direction.  Based on the decisions and views examined above, it seems
clear that it will only take a very minor step to reach this conclusion.
91. Id. at ¶¶ 542–43.
92. Id. at ¶ 542.
93. Anne Gallagher, Using International Human Rights Law to Better Protect Vic-
tims of Human Trafficking: The Prohibitions on Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labor
and Debt Bondage, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, 397, 416–17 (Laila Nadya Sadat
et al. eds., 2008).
94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.8, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
95. Id. at 416.
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There is well-established precedent directly linking trafficking in per-
sons to an essential element of slavery, namely, the “powers attaching
to the rights of ownership.”96  The language of the slavery conventions
only requires any power attaching to the rights of ownership to exist.
This connection was explicitly made both in the footnotes of the ICC
Elements of Crimes and in the European Court of Human Rights rul-
ing in Rantsev.97  This connection was also implicitly made in the
ICTY’s ruling in Kunarac.98  If trafficking in persons clearly meets
this element, than it is hard to see how it does not meet the entire
definition of slavery.
The well-recognized definition of slavery is, “the status or condition
of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the rights
of ownership are exercised.”99  According to this definition, slavery ex-
ists as a status or condition of a person when the powers attaching to
the rights of ownership have been exercised over him or her.  If traf-
ficking in persons inherently includes at least one of the powers at-
taching to the rights of ownership, then it follows that when
trafficking is inflicted on a person, the status or condition of slavery is
imputed with respect to that person.  Because trafficking in persons
is, by its very definition, exercised in a way that exploits a person, it is
hard to imagine a situation where trafficking in persons takes place
that would not meet this definition of slavery.
Some may argue that trafficking in persons is merely an institu-
tion or a practice similar to slavery and should not be classified as
slavery itself.  The Bellagio–Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parame-
ters of Slavery, however, draw a distinction between slavery and insti-
tutions and practices similar to slavery.100  These guidelines indicate
that slavery exists whenever any power attaching to the rights of own-
ership exists, and that an institution or practice similar to slavery be-
comes actual slavery when any of these powers are present.101  There
is significant legal precedent indicating that trafficking in persons in-
herently includes powers attaching to the rights of ownership.  This
would immediately elevate it to a status above that of being an insti-
tution or practice similar to slavery.
96. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 27, art. 7(1)(c); see also Rantsev v. Cyprus
and Russia, 2010-I, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65; Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T,
Judgment at ¶ 543.
97. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 27, art. 7(1)(c); Rantsev, 2010-I Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 65.
98. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment ¶ 543.
99. Slavery Convention, supra note 19, art. 1(1).
100. Bellagio–Harvard Guidelines, supra note 79, Guideline 9.
101. Id.
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D. An Alternative Way to Think About the Issue:
Commercial Sexual Exploitation as Slavery
This Comment argues that trafficking in persons is legally a form
of slavery worthy of protection under international law.  Many, how-
ever, may not yet be willing to make that connection; thus, this Com-
ment proposes an alternative perspective.  There has been much
debate as to whether trafficking in persons is a form of slavery, but
trying to equate these two practices as one in the same has created
much confusion and conflict.  Whereas the end means of sex traffick-
ing is commercial sexual exploitation, usually in the form of forced
prostitution, perhaps it is more accurate to think of commercial sexual
exploitation as a form of slavery.  Such an understanding is implicit in
the preamble to the European Trafficking Convention, which states
“trafficking in human beings may result in slavery for victims.”102
This understanding also erases questions as to whether classifying
trafficking in persons as slavery would subsequently mean that every
end means of trafficking is also slavery.  There are several exploitative
end means of trafficking in persons that are less likely to be classified
as slavery, such as organ harvesting.  Finding that commercial sexual
exploitation is slavery would remove this uncertainty by specifying
which end means of trafficking constitutes slavery, and provides a
framework to explore whether an obligation to criminalize prostitu-
tion exists.
The question becomes whether the powers attaching to the rights
of ownership are exercised in commercial sexual exploitation.  Sid-
darth Kara is an investigator who has spent his career documenting
the global trade in human beings, and he offers the following descrip-
tion of commercial sexual exploitation based on his documentations of
the practice:  Generally, commercial sexual exploitation involves the
violent coercion of unpaid sex services.  Once the victims have reached
their destination, the exploiter, usually a pimp, confiscates all their
possessions.  This includes their passports, money, cell phones, and
whatever else they may be carrying with them.  The victims are then
raped, tortured, starved, humiliated, and drugged by their exploiters
in order to condition them to provide sexual services to buyers submis-
sively and to deter them from trying to escape.  Victims are usually
kept in a brothel, club, massage parlor, or similar establishment
where they are sold to buyers several times a day and not permitted to
leave.  Usually, all of the profits from these services go to the pimp.  If
the victims are not submissive then they are drugged, beaten, and
sometimes killed in order to set an example for the others.  A similar
fate awaits those who try to escape, as those who attempt escape are
often killed in front of the other victims, who are subsequently forced
102. European Trafficking Convention, supra note 60, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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to clean up the mess.  This conditioning and exploitation will persist
for years.  Pimps will eventually choose some victims to sell them-
selves on the street, but only those victims that they can trust will do
so submissively and without trying to escape.  Those victims are given
quotas for each night, and failure to meet that quota results in torture
and starvation.  Escape is unlikely because the victims are generally
far from home in a country the language of which they do not know.
They are also without their passport, money, or any other form of
identification, so they risk incarceration or deportation.  Going to the
police is usually not an option because the police are often buyers or
have been bribed to return any escapees to their pimp.103
The above description encompasses just one end means of traffick-
ing in persons and describes the realities of commercial sexual ex-
ploitation.  When considering the reality of commercial sexual
exploitation in light of what has been discussed, it is difficult to see
how this cannot fall within a classification as slavery.  It is worth re-
peating that the internationally recognized definition of slavery only
requires any of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership to ex-
ist, not necessarily all of them.104  Thus, if the preceding description
contains anything that might be considered a power attaching to the
rights of ownership, then a strong argument could be made that slav-
ery exists in these circumstances.
To see if any of the powers attaching to the rights of ownership
exist in the circumstances described above, this Commnet considers
the conditions identified by the UN Secretary-General as individual
manifestations of powers attaching to the rights of ownership.  The
victims in these circumstances are the objects of purchase, commodi-
ties to be bought and sold for sexual service.  The master, in this case
the pimp, may use the victim’s capacity to work in an absolute man-
ner.  The products of the victims’ labor, in this case the money paid for
their sexual services, becomes the absolute possession of the pimp
with no compensation offered to the victims.  The status of the victims
is permanent, that is to say, it cannot be terminated by the will of the
individual subject to it.  This meets four out of the six considerations
offered by the UN Secretary-General in the 1953 memorandum.105
Furthermore, most of the time the victims have no freedom of move-
ment, as their movement is usually exclusively controlled by their
pimp.  Frequently, police will even return escaped victims to their
pimps, despite the fact that forced prostitution is illegal in almost
every country.106  This conduct, which is intrinsic in commercial sex-
103. See generally KARA, supra note 2, at 11–16 (describing the general practice of
commercial sexual exploitation).
104. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
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ual exploitation, reveals a general understanding that pimps enjoy
rights of ownership over victims.
The elements of the crimes of enslavement and sexual slavery
under the ICC Elements of Crime are identical, except that sexual
slavery includes the additional element that the perpetrator caused
such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual na-
ture.107  The Rome Statute, however, identifies the crime of enforced
prostitution as a separate offence from sexual slavery, and the ele-
ments of enforced prostitution are very different than those of sexual
slavery.108  It is unclear whether commercial sexual exploitation is
classified as sexual slavery or as enforced prostitution, and it is will
likely require a case-by-case analysis rather than a per se classifica-
tion.  However, the practice itself seems to involve several manifesta-
tions of powers attaching to the rights of ownership, so regardless of
whether it is classified as sexual slavery or enforced prostitution
under the Rome Statute, it can be classified as a form of slavery.
III. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS TO
CRIMINALIZE AND PREVENT SLAVERY AND SEX
TRAFFICKING
The implications of classifying trafficking in persons or commercial
sexual exploitation as slavery are extremely substantial.  The most
significant of these implications relates to the obligations arising out
of a newly achieved status as a jus cogens norm and the obligations
erga omnes that slavery carries with it.  Specifically, classifying traf-
ficking in persons as slavery would impose an obligation on states to
take any and all steps necessary to abolish trafficking in person or
commercial sexual exploitation (depending upon which practice is con-
sidered slavery).  This Part will examine the obligation to abolish slav-
ery more closely in light of the conclusion that trafficking in person
and commercial sexual exploitation is slavery and in light of the un-
derlying assumption for this Comment.  In particular, these obliga-
tions will be examined with the intent of determining whether they
create a subsequent obligation to criminalize prostitution.
A. Obligation to Criminalize and Prevent Sex Trafficking
Aside from the obligation to criminalize and prevent slavery, there
exists an international legal obligation to criminalize trafficking in
persons.  These obligations arise primarily out of treaty law.  Article 5
of the Palermo Protocol provides that “[e]ach State Party shall adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish
as criminal offences the conduct set forth in Article 3 of this Protocol,
107. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 27, art. 7(1)(g)(2).
108. Id. art. 7(1)(g)(3).
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when committed intentionally.”109  Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol
states that “State Parties shall establish comprehensive policies, pro-
grams and other measures to prevent and combat trafficking in per-
sons and to protect victims of trafficking in persons, especially women
and children, from revictimization.”110  The European Trafficking
Convention contains an identical provision to Article 5 of the Palermo
Protocol,111 as well as a provision that provides that “[e]ach Party
shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences under its internal law, the
use of services which are the object of exploitation as referred to in
[Article 4(a)]112 of this Convention . . . . ”113  Article 1 of the European
Union Council Framework Decision on Combating Trafficking in
Human Beings (“EU Framework Decision”) obligates member states
to take the necessary measures to ensure that trafficking in persons is
a punishable offense, including a specific provision to criminalize traf-
ficking in person “for the purpose of the exploitation of the prostitu-
tion of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, including in
pornography.”114  Such an obligation can also easily be inferred from
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (“CEDAW”), which provides that “State parties shall
take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to suppress all
forms of traffic in women.”115
It is important to understand what this obligation actually re-
quires of states.  It requires states to criminalize trafficking in persons
as it has been defined by international law.116  While it does not re-
quire states to reproduce the legal definition laid out in treaties and
other instruments, it does require certain core features be included in
order to satisfy the obligation.117  Some of these features are the dif-
ference between trafficking in adults and in children, the criminaliza-
tion of trafficking in persons for all exploitative purposes, gender-
neutrality, no requirement that exploitation actually take place, and a
provision that the consent of the victim does not alter the offender’s
criminal liability.118
109. Palermo Protocol, supra note 39, art. 5(1).
110. Id. art. 9(1)(a)–(b).
111. European Trafficking Convention, supra note 60, art. 18.
112. Article 4(a) provides the definition for trafficking in persons as discussed above.
Id. art. 4(a).
113. European Trafficking Convention, supra note 60, art. 19.
114. EU Framework Decision, supra note 60, art. 1(1).
115. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
art. 6, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
116. GALLAGHER, supra note 12, at 373.
117. Id. at 373–74.
118. Id. at 374.
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Perhaps more important than what this obligation requires of
states, is a consideration of what this obligation does not require of
states.  No major trafficking in persons instrument imposes an obliga-
tion to criminalize anything other than the conduct set out in the trea-
ties themselves.  This includes the criminalization of some or all of
those separate elements identified in the international legal definition
of trafficking in persons or any similar or related conduct.119  Under
this understanding, it is very difficult to argue that any trafficking in
persons instrument requires the criminalization of collateral practices
such as prostitution (even under the assumptions made for this
Comment).
Article 9 of the Palermo Protocol requires states to take steps to
prevent trafficking in persons and to protect victims from re-victimiza-
tion.120  The actual provision only requires states to “establish com-
prehensive policies, programs and other measures” to prevent
trafficking in persons, it does not say anything about requiring states
to take legislative measures.121  Legislative requirements, however,
could be inferred under the phrase “other measures.”122  A much
stronger inference can be made from the provision in CEDAW123 that
provides all appropriate measures must be taken to suppress traffick-
ing in women including legislation.124  This lends strength to the ar-
gument that prostitution must be criminalized by the parties to
CEDAW, considering that the overwhelming majority of sex traffick-
ing victims are women.125  If states must take all appropriate mea-
sures to suppress sex trafficking under CEDAW, and if legalized
prostitution is inextricably linked to rises in the prevalence of sex traf-
ficking, then it follows that states have an obligation to criminalize
prostitution in order to take appropriate measures to suppress sex
trafficking.
This conclusion is contingent on two findings.  First, one must de-
finitively conclude that legalized prostitution and rises in the preva-
lence of sex trafficking are inextricably linked.  There is significant
research to support this conclusion,126 but it remains unsettled, and
this Comment does not intend to argue one way or the other.  Second,
one must conclude that criminalizing prostitution is an appropriate
measure to suppress sex trafficking.  This comes down to a policy ar-
gument, and would require an analysis as to whether the rights of
119. Id. at 376.
120. Palermo Protocol, supra note 39, art. 9.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. CEDAW, supra note 115, art. 6.
124. Id. (emphasis added).
125. UNODC 2014 Report, supra note 56, at 37 (reporting that approximately 97% of
sex trafficking victims are women).
126. Cho, supra note 8, at 67.
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legitimately consenting sex workers outweigh the rights of sex traf-
ficking victims.  In other words, this would be a conflict of rights
analysis.
At this stage in the analysis, it is quite a stretch to say that the
international obligation to criminalize sex trafficking includes an obli-
gation to criminalize prostitution.  Treaties regarding trafficking in
persons only obligate states to criminalize sex trafficking and all the
elements of trafficking in persons.  Furthermore, no customary norm
exists which would indicate that states are obligated to take all mea-
sures to abolish sex trafficking.  The only treaty that extends an obli-
gation beyond that of merely criminalizing sex trafficking is CEDAW,
and this is only binding on the parties to the treaty.  If an obligation to
criminalize prostitution exists, it must arise from an obligation to pre-
vent slavery.
B. Obligation to Criminalize and Prevent Slavery
Unlike sex trafficking, slavery carries with it significant obliga-
tions that are covered in both treaties and in customary international
law.  The earliest international legal obligation regarding slavery can
be found in the 1926 Slavery Convention. Article 2 of the Convention
compels the parties to the treaty to “prevent and suppress the slave
trade” and “to bring about, progressively and as soon as possible, the
complete abolition of slavery in all its forms.”127  This is incredibly
strong language, obligating states to completely abolish slavery in
every form in which it manifests itself.  Thus, the provision leaves no
room for any tolerance of slavery.  Unlike the obligation to criminalize
sex trafficking, the obligation regarding slavery extends beyond mere
criminalization and stretches to abolition.  This provision also takes
into account the understanding that slavery can take many different
forms, calling for parties to abolish slavery “in all its forms.”  It left
slavery open to embrace an ever-widening range of practices, allowing
for every possible manifestation of slavery to be abolished.128  Vis-
count Cecil stated in his Report to the Assembly of the League of Na-
tions that the obligations in the 1926 Convention “were to bring about
the disappearance from written legislation or from the custom of the
country of everything which admits the maintenance by a private indi-
vidual of rights over another person of the same nature as the rights
which an individual can have over things.”129
127. Slavery Convention, supra note 19, art. 2(a)–(b).
128. ALLAIN, supra note 15, at 99.
129. ALLAIN, supra note 14, at 113 (quoting Reports Presented to the Assembly by the
Sixth Committee, League of Nations Doc. A.1104 1926 VI (1926)).
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The 1956 Supplementary Convention builds upon the obligation in
Article 2 of the 1926 Convention and identifies four manifestations of
slavery-like practices that this obligation extends to, stating that:
Each of the State Parties to this Convention shall take all practicable and
necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively and as
soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following insti-
tutions and practices [debt bondage, serfdom, servile marriages, and child
trafficking], where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by the
definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention signed as
Geneva on 25 September 1926.130
The prohibition on slavery was reiterated in Article 8 of the ICCPR,
which states, “no one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-
trade in all their forms shall be prohibited.”131  Article 4 of the ICCPR
provides that no state may deviate from this prohibition at any
time.132
These obligations clearly articulate what they require of states,
which is that states must do everything they can to abolish every form
of slavery within their jurisdiction.  These obligations are erga
omnes,133 meaning they are universal in character and owed to the
entire international community.134  This gives every state an incen-
tive to comply with the obligation to abolish slavery and the capacity
to bring suit against another state in the International Court of Jus-
tice regardless of whether it has suffered direct harm.135  Thus, the
obligation to prevent and abolish slavery extends to all states, regard-
less of whether they have become parties to the 1926 or 1956 Conven-
tions.  The fact that slavery is a jus cogens norm also prevents any
state from excusing themselves from these obligations as a persistent
objector.136
Therefore, an obligation to criminalize prostitution exists under
the international obligation to abolish slavery.  The obligation to abol-
ish slavery requires all states to take every step necessary to eradicate
the practice of slavery in all its forms. Because trafficking in persons
and commercial sexual exploitation are both forms of slavery under
international law, states are obligated to take every step necessary to
130. 1956 Supplementary Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.
131. ICCPR, supra note 94, art. 8. (emphasis added).
132. Id. art. 4(2).
133. Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 3 (Feb.
5).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
902 (Am. Law Inst. 2000).
135. Id.
136. Generally, a state may show that they are not bound by a customary rule of inter-
national law by showing that they have been a persistent objector during the
time of the rules formation.  However, this exception does not apply when the
customary norm is a jus cogens norm.  Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and
for Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 121, 133–34 (2010).
2016] SLAVERY IN THE NAME OF TOLERANCE 597
abolish these practices.  It follows that if legalized prostitution is inex-
tricably linked to rises in the prevalence of sex trafficking, then one of
the steps that states are required to take is to criminalize prostitution.
Otherwise, states will be unable to fulfill their obligation to abolish
slavery in all its forms.
As mentioned at the beginning of this Comment, the underlying
assumption is that the legalization of prostitution will always lead to
an increase in the prevalence of sex trafficking.137 The obligations dis-
cussed above impose sweeping and clear requirements for states: They
must bring about progressively, and as soon as possible, the complete
abolition or abandonment of slavery,138 and must take every measure
necessary to abolish slavery within their jurisdiction.  Thus, prostitu-
tion, because it always leads to an increase in slavery, must be
criminalized in order to fulfill this obligation.  Of course, future re-
search showing no causal link between legalization of prostitution and
an increase in sex trafficking would call this conclusion into question.
IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN OBLIGATION TO CRIMINALIZE
AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS
Concluding that a legal obligation exists to criminalize prostitution
has significant implications.  One major implication is that criminal-
ization would infringe on the rights of sex workers who engage in the
practice of prostitution as a legitimate form of work.  Many people
may object that an international legal obligation to criminalize prosti-
tution violates the basic human rights of sex workers, and should be
ignored or diminished due to these infringements.  Due to the gravity
of the repercussions following from an obligation to criminalize prosti-
tution, a brief discussion of the conflicting rights of the sex workers
and sex trafficking victims must be had at this point.  To provide gui-
dance in this analysis of competing human rights, the Ontario Human
Rights Commission (“OHRC”) released a policy on competing human
rights that provides a helpful framework for analyzing this issue.139
The policy includes a three-step process: The first step is to recognize
the competing rights claims and determine whether they are legiti-
mate rights.  The second step is to try and reconcile the competing
rights claims and evaluate whether there is a solution that allows en-
joyment of each right.  The third and final step is to make a decision,
and determine what the best course of action would be.140
137. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
138. Gallagher, Using International Human Rights Law to Better Protect Victims of
Human Trafficking, supra note 93, at 406.
139. Ontario Human Rights Commission, Policy on Competing Human Rights (Janu-
ary 26, 2012), http://www.ohrc.on.ca/sites/default/files/policy%20on%20competing
%20human%20rights_accessible_2.pdf [hereinafter Conflict of Rights Policy].
140. Id. at 6.
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Recognition of the human rights of sex workers has made consider-
able progress in recent years, leading many human rights agencies to
reevaluate their stances on the criminalization of prostitution.141
Most recently, Amnesty International modified its position, moving
from advocating for the criminalization of prostitution to instead advo-
cating for the full decriminalization of prostitution.142  The organiza-
tion articulated their position in a draft policy that was circulated
among members before their 2015 International Council Meeting,
highlighting the various human rights considerations of sex workers
that led to their decision to modify their policy.  Among these human
rights were the sex workers’ right to security of person, their right to
work and to just and favorable conditions of work, their right to
health, to consent to sex and to consent to the sale of sex, and to be
free from discrimination and arbitrary detention.143  These are all
well-recognized and legitimate human rights, most which can be
found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.144
If it is true, however, that legalized prostitution is inextricably
linked to rises in the prevalence of sex trafficking, then these rights
would be in direct conflict with those of men, women, and children
who are exploited through sex trafficking and commercial sexual ex-
ploitation.  These rights are immediately apparent, including the very
same rights considered for sex workers, as well as the right to life, the
right to liberty, the right to be protected from inhuman and degrading
treatment, the right to freedom of movement, and the right to a stan-
dard of living adequate for the health and well-being for himself,
among others.145  Perhaps the most important right for purposes of
this discussion is the right to not be held in slavery or in servitude.146
This right is articulated in Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and has been one of the rights most universally af-
firmed by the international community.147  This is evidenced by the
141. These human rights agencies include the World Health Organization, UNAIDS,
the Global Alliance Against Trafficking in Women, Human Rights Watch, the
International Labor Organization, and several others.
142. Amnesty International Draft Policy on Sex Work, Memorandum from Amnesty
International International Board to Sections and Structures (July 7, 2015),
https://amnestysgprdasset.blob.core.windows.net/media/10243/draft-sw-policy-
for-external-publication.pdf.
143. Id.
144. See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25 (identifying
internationally recognized human rights).  The only right not found in this decla-
ration is the right to consensual sex and to consent to sell sex, although there is
jurisprudence to lend weight to the argument that these are legitimate rights.
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 529 U.S. 558
(2003).
145. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 25.
146. Id. art. 4.
147. Id.
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fact that the prohibition of slavery is a jus cogens norm of customary
international law.  If sex trafficking and commercial sexual exploita-
tions are legally forms of slavery, then this right carries with it consid-
erable weight in this discussion.
After recognition of the various human rights at play, the question
thus becomes whether there is a way to reconcile these rights in a
manner that allows them to all be enjoyed.  As noted by the OHRC, no
rights are absolute.148  A strong argument could be made, however,
that the right to not be held in slavery or in servitude is almost abso-
lute.  This is evidenced by the fact that it is recognized as a jus cogens
norm of customary international law and as creating obligations erga
omnes.  An international legal obligation exists to not only criminalize
slavery, but to abolish it completely.  This is also one of the few obliga-
tions that cannot be waived under any circumstances, including in
times of war.  Unlike all the other rights discussed above, the right to
not be held in slavery is so fundamental that the international com-
munity will not tolerate violations.  If the underlying assumption for
this Comment and the conclusions reached in this Comment are cor-
rect, then it is hard to see how the rights of sex workers can be recon-
ciled with the rights of sex trafficking victims to not be held in slavery.
The implications of this conclusion would be that legitimate sex
workers will not be allowed to exercise their right to engage in this
form of work because doing so will inevitably lead to the exploitation
of others.  This is no doubt an unpopular position, but the question is
whether we are willing to tolerate slavery under any circumstances.
If the answer is no, and if the underlying assumption and the conclu-
sions reached in this Comment are correct, then prostitution must be
criminalized.  This would not be the first time certain actions are per
se criminalized, even when there are certain situations where the con-
duct being criminalized does not lead to the undesired results.  For
example, in the United States, failure to stop at a red light is a crimi-
nal offense, even in situations where there is no cross-traffic.149  This
is based on the policy decision that it is better to inconvenience some
drivers than to allow them to decide on their own when to stop at a red
light and potentially cause an accident.  Another example is laws in
the United States which criminalize driving under the influence of al-
cohol.  This is based on the policy decision that the dangers of driving
under the influence of alcohol are so great, that it should per se prohib-
ited even if a driver can show that he was not actually a danger to
anyone.  Likewise, it would be a wise policy decision to criminalize
prostitution even though some people engage in prostitution as a legit-
imate form of work, because it is better than decriminalizing it alto-
148. Conflict of Rights Policy, supra note 139, at 6.
149. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 60-6,123(3)(a), 60-6,119(1) (Reissue 2010).
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gether and thus leading to an increase in the exploitation of people
through slavery.
One concern raised by advocates for the decriminalization of pros-
titution is that criminalized prostitution leads to genuine victims be-
ing treated as criminals.  This is a legitimate problem, as many sex
trafficking victims find themselves not in the care of social workers,
but in the custody of law enforcement officers.  Thus, it may become
necessary to implement a model that protects victims of sex traffick-
ing, while also deterring the practice by criminalizing prostitution.
Sweden has attempted to address this issue, and has introduced what
has come to be known as the “Nordic Model.”150  In 1999, the Swedish
Law that Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services entered into force
and criminalized the purchasing of sex.151  This law targeted the buy-
ers of sexual services, exempting the sex workers from being targeted
by law enforcement officials.  Thus, buyers can be arrested, but the
sex workers cannot.  There is still much debate as to whether this is
an effective model, but it may serve as an excellent starting point for
developing a policy that protects victims and deters the buying and
selling of sexual services.
V. CONCLUSION
Under international law, there is a legal obligation to criminalize
prostitution in order to fulfill the universal obligation to abolish slav-
ery.  This conclusion is contingent on two findings.  First, it must be
shown that laws decriminalizing or legalizing prostitution inevitably
lead to a rise in the prevalence of sex trafficking within that particular
jurisdiction.  This Comment does not argue that this is true or attempt
to prove whether this is true.  This theory is supported by at least one
major study, but is far from being regarded as a fact, thus more re-
search must be done in this area.  Second, sex trafficking or commer-
cial sexual exploitation must be recognized as a form of slavery under
international law.  Both of these practices are indeed forms of slavery
under international law and that the trajectory of international un-
derstanding is heading towards classifying sex trafficking as slavery.
This would have major implications, elevating these practices to jus
cogens norms of customary international law and creating obligations
erga omnes in regards to these practices.  One of the implications
would be that states must take all necessary steps to abolish these
practices within their jurisdictions, and if prostitution allows these
practices to flourish, then it must be criminalized.
150. Mary Ann Peters, Nordic Model Key to Beating Exploitation of Sex Workers, CNN
(April 18, 2016) http://www.cnn.com/2016/04/18/opinions/prostitution-nordic-
model-peters/
151. Act that Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services, BROTTSBALKEN [BRB] [Penal
Code] 1998:408 (Swed.).
2016] SLAVERY IN THE NAME OF TOLERANCE 601
Such a conclusion inevitably creates issues.  Perhaps the most
prevalent issue is how to reconcile this obligation with the infringe-
ment of basic human rights enjoyed by sex workers who engage in
prostitution as a form of legitimate work.  No right, however, is abso-
lute.  If legalized prostitution really does perpetuate slavery, then it
must be criminalized, even if it denies sex workers the right to partici-
pate in prostitution as a legitimate form of work.  Otherwise, a form of
slavery would be tolerated, which is something that international law
does not permit.  Criminalizing prostitution would not represent the
first time a certain conduct was criminalized in order to protect people
even if that conduct does not always result in the undesirable out-
come.  A policy would need to be developed that protects victims of sex
trafficking while also deterring the practice by criminalizing prostitu-
tion.  Sweden provides an excellent example of such a policy, and an
examination of the “Nordic Model” may serve as a starting point for
developing appropriate criminalization laws.
In regards to combatting sex trafficking and commercial sexual ex-
ploitation, the criminalization of prostitution must one of many steps
taken.  There are countless other variables to take into account, in-
cluding examining the circumstances which make individuals vulner-
able to these practices in the first place and addressing the demand
which drives this illegal business.  If it true, however, that legalized
prostitution perpetuates this injustice, then criminalization must be
at least one of the steps taken.  Sex trafficking cannot be abolished as
long as there are systems in place that allow for it to flourish, and we
cannot tolerate a form of slavery under any circumstances.
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